Competitiveness and availability of transparent information are necessary in capital market. Information quality effects decision making and causes better resource allocation, which in turn leads to efficiency. Information transparency results in long term vision, reaching to new sources of capital, lower cost of capital, accountable management and finally, increasing of the shareholders, wealth..This project investigated Benford’s LAW as an indicator of data quality in Tehran Stock EXCHANGE. The data used in this research included the first digit of daily close price and indexes .The study period was from the beginning of 1999 to the end of 2009.The top 25 percent of companies with regard to trading days were selected as a sample of the research.Kolmogorove-smirnov’s and Goodness of Fit tests were used to estimate the model.The results showed that the investigated data was inconsistent with Benford’s LAW.

Entering the market and exchanging money and goods in some cases is accompanied by disputes arising from this. For this purpose, according to the foundations, goals, economic functions and different dimensions of these markets, some principles should be introduced as the legal principles underlying the legal system of the securities market. The principle of market fairness, the principle of market transparency, and the principle of market order and supervision can be mentioned as the principles governing the securities markets. These general principles can include more detailed principles such as fair competition, equality in the possibility of using information, non-discrimination and fair access to the market. It seems that the important principles of proceedings in dealing with crimes related to the stock EXCHANGE in Iran cover more general aspects of legal relations due to the presence of judicial authorities in the arbitration board and guaranteeing the implementation of the LAW.

One of the most important issues in synallagmatic contracts is the liability in contractual consideration. All legal systems have faced this problem and have proposed rules to solve it. In Islamic LAW, this is referred to as “EXCHANGE Liability". But in French LAW, it is known as the "theory of cause", which is the most important concept in contract LAW. The purpose of this study is a comparative study of the concept, basis, and nature of "EXCHANGE Liability" and "theory of cause". This will be done in a descriptive, comparative, and analytical method. According to the findings of this study, EXCHANGE Liability is a kind of “voluntary liability” whether it is the result of a valid or invalid contract. And the theory of cause has a similar role in civil LAW. Despite the similarities between these two theories, there are also differences, especially in terms of territory. One of the uses of liability in contractual relations is the “EXCHANGE liability”. The delivery of the EXCHANGE in EXCHANGE contracts is not achieved once the contract is concluded, but it is a mutual obligation that each of the parties undertakes to fulfill by concluding the contract. Even though there are many branches and examples of the EXCHANGE liability in Iranian LAW and the EXCHANGE liability has been recognized in a broad sense,however, in Iran's legal sources, this type of liability is referred to as "compensatory liability",in connection with the discussion of Article 387 C. C. In jurisprudential sources, it is described as "EXCHANGE liability". Although there are various theories in the legal systems such as "Cause", "Consideration" and "EXCHANGE liability" to create and adjust the balance between the EXCHANGE parties in a reciprocal contract, they all have a common goal and to some extent a meaning. Liability for the contractual EXCHANGE is mentioned in all reciprocal contracts and exists in the stage of the execution of the contract even in the assumption of loss of EXCHANGE and cancellation or liquidation of the contract. with the implementation of its effects, it means delivering EXCHANGE or its substitute, will be expired. LAWyers in the Roman-Germanic system have proposed the "theory of cause" to determine a standard as a basic element in the validity of contracts and as proof of the seriousness and commitment of the parties to their obligations. The main question of this study is: what is the relationship between “EXCHANGE liability" in Islamic and Iranian LAW and the "theory of cause" in the Germanic Roman system? This research shows that to create and maintain balance and justice in reciprocal contracts, the Islamic LAW has provided “EXCHANGE liability". The concept of “EXCHANGE liability" is the responsibility for the contractual EXCHANGE, and the concept of the “theory of cause” is to express the necessity of the existence of a cause for the contract from its creation to its execution. The emphasis of the “theory of cause” is more on the existence of the legal act, while the emphasis of the “EXCHANGE liability" is more on the nature of the reciprocal contract and the guarantee of the performance of the tasks contained in it. From the point of view of the content of the “EXCHANGE liability", it is a mandatory rule, and it is not considered a financial right. The “cause” is also independent and separate from the character of the contracting party, and it is the same for every type of contract and is related to its legal structure. "Cause" is a real and logical truth, which is impossible to ignore. Both concepts have a similar basis, including being rational and establishing a balance between the parties, and preventing the loss of the parties. However, the domain of the “cause theory” is beyond the domain of “EXCHANGE liability", because it includes non-reciprocal contracts and even events. But from another point of view, the “EXCHANGE liability" has a wider scope. Because in principle, the existence and manner of creation, the necessity, and manner of execution of the contract, in the assumption of loss of EXCHANGE, annulment or liquidation of the reciprocal contract, in the assumption of non-execution of the contract and the emergence of contractual liability, and the manner of implementation of the effects of this liability and the number of compensable damages, have an effective presence.

Objective: In general, when a financial market works ordinarily, the probability distribution of the first significant digit of the returns of the assets listed therein follows Benford’ s LAW, but does not necessarily follow this distribution in the case of anomalous events. This LAW shows the contingency of various digits in a set of numbers thus it can be used for assessing data sets that occur naturally. Method: The present study applied Benford LAW in order to investigate the empirical probability distribution of the first and the second digit of daily stocks return in listed companies in the Tehran Stock EXCHANGE during 1384 – 1393. Results: The findings show that the data of daily stocks return in listed companies in the Tehran Stock EXCHANGE that used in the present study do not obey the Benford LAW. This can be due to some reasons such as different data transformation or influential conditions in the Iran stock market.

Different aspects of competition in stock EXCHANGEs have been discussed in the literature from either a positive or normative perspective but this paper seeks to come up with an approach encompassing both positive and normative dimensions of competition in various aspects of stock EXCHANGEs’ activities. As far as the positive nature of the securities market and industry is concerned, conflicting trends are emerging. The liberalization of securities markets and the disappearance of technical barriers have dismantled the monopoly of national stock EXCHANGEs but led to more consolidation. However, we are also witnessing a destabilizing and fragmenting effect of competition on these markets. Following an analysis of the importance of recognition of the normative/positive dichotomy in approaching competition in financial services, we discuss the centrality of information disclosure in creating competitive and stable financial markets. Disclosure of information, therefore, reinforces both competitive and prudential objectives alike. In further attempt, we discuss the tension between the principles of competition and prudence alongside the conflict between competition objectives and advantages in economies of scope and scale. While arguments in weighing the competition against economies of scope and scale are evenly balanced, the unique characteristics of such markets do not allow the absolute application of competition principles when it comes to prudential concerns.

Electronic bill of lading has a special place in commercial LAW today. On the one hand, in parallel with the observance of business principles, including the principle of the speed of business affairs, its electronification is also inevitable and requires the application of rules and regulations to stabilise and validate them. On the other hand, because the judicial validation of this crucial electronic document is ambiguous, it is necessary to use the international rules and the LAWs of leading countries to regulate the governing rules for this document. Therefore, in the analysis of Iran's LAWs in this regard with the descriptive and analytical method, the criteria of UNCITRAL rules and combined with those LAWs of the United States as a leading country in registering the rules of electronification of commercial documents, the international achievements of validation and verification of the confirmation and assignment of this document to the obligee And the issuer of the electronic bill is introduced. This way, electronic signature stabilisation criteria and public assurance methods, a judicial act, can be selected as a criterion and presented as a problem. Investigations showed that the rules of UNCITRAL are closer to the rules of justice in this regard, and some of the rules of the LAW of Utah in the United States regarding electronic bills of lading are different from what is the public and private link of judicial validation of other electronic evidence.